Rosenzweig changed his mind about the issue of translating the name of God.While in his Star of Redemption he had almost always used 'the Eternal' for the transliteration of the name of God, 3 he now favoured another option: the use of the personal pronoun. To be sure, Rosenzweig is silent about this change. In his article, his critique of the use of 'the Eternal' is not aimed at his own works, but at Moses Mendelssohn's translation. Given the fact that Mendelssohn's position had once been Rosenzweig's own, it is perhaps not surprising that Rosenzweig acknowledges that Mendelssohn also recognized something crucial. He recognized, says Rosenzweig, that the translator's account of the translation of the name of God is not to be found at the ¢rst appearance of this name in Scripture (Gen. II:4), but only at the moment of God's self-revelation in Exod. III:14. 4 Hence, the choice of a suitable rendering of God's name is decided at this particular verse.
It is now clear that, when focusing on the present task, it is most important to analyse Buber's and Rosenzweig's exchanges on Exod. III during their translation of the Bible before attempting to elucidate their thoughts by interpreting their remarks in the essays mentioned above.
ROSENZWEIG'S THOUGHTS IN DIALOGUE WITH BUBER
Given the task in hand, one cannot limit the analysis to Exod. III.When reading the archived exchanges between Buber and Rosenzweig, one soon realizes that it is necessary to start at the 'beginning' . Anna Elisabeth Bauer gives a very succinct account of these beginnings and of the development of Rosenzweig's thoughts on how to translate the name of God in the Bible, 5 drawing on his letter to Martin Goldner of 23 June 1927. 6 According to this sourceçonce again diverging from the information given in Rosenzweig's later systematic account in 'The Eternal'ç Buber's and Rosenzweig's re£ections regarding the translation of God's name had Rosenwald already started with their notes on the book of beginnings, namely Genesis, because it was here of course that they ¢rst faced the problem of how to translate the tetragrammaton and the word Elohim.
The need for a new translation
It was Rosenzweig 7 who insisted on starting with a revision of Luther's Bible. 8 When beginning the Bible translation with Buber, he was of course aware that the tetragrammaton (hwhy) is a name, and Elohim (<yhla) simply a term. However, in Luther's translation, it is also a term, namely 'the Lord', that represents the tetragrammaton, and another term, 'God', that stands for Elohim. Rosenzweig initially adopted Luther's translation, but soon realized it was wrong: ''We said to ourselves that actually we should do the reverseçshould say 'God' for the name, 'Lord' for Elohim. 'God' has for us something of the character of a name, while 'Lord' has the generalized, conceptual quality of Elohim. '' 9 Still, he felt some support was necessary from Luther's side to consider these changes, and thus continued: ''Indeed, Luther evidently also instinctively translates chapters 2 and 
Experimenting with pronouns
Rosenzweig then started considering the use of the personal pronoun for the translation of God's name, without being able to say why. 19 He saw a similarity with the term 'the Lord', which likewise is not a proper name be¢tting a particular person. Only the use of the de¢nite article implies which lord is being referred to.
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The same is true of personal pronouns: only through capitalization and majuscules does it become clear which 'He' is meant, namely God. Rosenzweig writes:
'The Lord' is tolerable everywhere that 'Yahweh' is not entirely intolerable. [. . .] If there were no genitives, I would propose: HE, YOU, I etc. Yet HIS people, HIS law etc. is no replacement for the genitive. Theologically, the majuscules do not reek here; it is simply something that has never been undertaken before. Moreover, it sounds too mysterious; but that can be attributed to the fact that God is called by a name. And that the mystery is explicated on thousands of sheets of paper and yet remains a mystery, that is of course the essence of this book and that is the reason why it isçthe Book of Revelation. One week later, Rosenzweig continues his thoughts and connects 'GOD'and the personal pronouns, focusing on Exod. XV:3: wm? hwhy hmjlm ?ya hwhy (''YHWH is a warrior,YHWH his name''). He says:
I began with HashemTsevaos [twabc hwhy] and the sentence about the man of war in the Song at the Sea. I realized that there one has to say GOD. As it [the capitalization] happens in the case of personal pronouns, and not always, it is without an aftertaste . . . And HE is hmjlm ?ya [a warrior], GOD his name. Hence, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, one may, with discretion, write GOD's instead of HIS. For both are possible. LORD, on the other hand, is best avoided. 22 Here, Rosenzweig emphasizes the character of the tetragrammaton as a name. The wealth of meaning traditionally invested in the word 'God' needs no further explanation. Rosenzweig tries to convey this meaning by establishing a connection between 'God' and the personal pronouns. Through their utilizationçfor the ¢rst timeçthe word 'God' is perceived anew, now not only as a term but also as a name.
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The transparency of God's name as a title
In his letter to Martin Goldner, however, Rosenzweig expresses his realization that in the name YHWH a meaning also resonates that is at one with the name, for otherwise the phrase wm? hwhy (Adonai shemo) would be meaningless:
Rather even at the time when the name was still spoken, whether asYahweh orçfor even this is not certainçYeheweh, it could not be spoken without evoking the name's meaning^even at that time, that is, the name was wholly transparent. We have a very clear proof of this: the phrase Adonai shemo [wm? hwhy], no doubt familiar to you from at least the Song at the Sea [Ex 15,3]. This phrase becomes nonsense if it is translated: 'his name is Yahweh' . A battle cry in this formç'his name is Mars!' 'his name is Zeus!', even 'his name is Wilhelm' (though the case is di¡erent with 'his name is Napoleon', since here, because of the ¢rst Napoleon, the name has to some extent become a concept)ç would be met by the hostile army with a simple 'so?'or 'so what?' But meaning enters in when a noun is introduced, as in Luther: 'Lord is his name!' Or in the Vulgate: Omnipotens nomen ejus. And Friedrich Leopold von Stolberg translates the phrase rightly as:'His name is: I-am!' 24 In an undated letter also printed in the edition of his working papers, Rosenzweig further comments on the translation of the phrase wm? hwhy: ''The moment one translates it with the name of the god, it becomes pure nonsense. ' 
THE EXCHANGE ON EXODUS III
Rosenzweig stated retroactively in 'The Eternal' that it is the translation of Exod. III:14 which determines how the name of God is translated. 30 Thus, it is necessary to examine Buber's and Rosenzweig's exchanges on these verses.
The Martin Buber Archive in Jerusalem holds a draft of Buber's translation of Exod. III:3 which shows the later corrections Buber made. In another extant manuscript there, these corrections are already worked into the original writing. According to these manuscripts, Buber ¢rst proposed Luther's ''I will be the one that I will be'' 31 for hyha r?a hyha in Exod. III:14a, and ''I-will-be'' 32 for hyha in Exod. III:14b. This was then corrected to ''I will be-there, as the one being there'', 33 and ''I-am-there'', 34 or in the clean copy, ''I AM THERE'' . 35 The corrected term ''being there'' ('' dasein'') was also applied to $mu hyha in Exod. III:12, 25 which ¢rst read ''I will be with you'', 36 but was then corrected to''I will be there with you'' . 37 Rosenzweig comments (as preserved in his working papers) as follows:
It does not work with ''being'' . That is hopelessly Platonized in German, as in any postPlatonic language, medieval Hebrew not excluded. [. . .] The words are not 'a philosophy of the Bible', but evolve totally out of the moment and thus of course encompass eternity too. The present is also the being, but the being does not need to become present.' ehyeh ' as› her ' ehyeh is, like all explanations of names, no name in itself, but a real spoken sentence, the wataumer [how to say], which is followed by the concentration within the name, the watiqra [how to write]. Therefore, just as for the being present, the being there can only be expressed thus: I will be there howsoever I will be-there.
38
He also comments on Exod. III:12: ''In order to grasp this in the sense of 'being there, present', [one should translate]: 'Certainly, I shall be there at your side' . '' 39 Rosenzweig picks up on the meaning of this verse in his article 'The Eternal' too. Likewise, for Exod. III:14b he proposes the translation ''I AM THERE sends me to you'', 40 and comments: ''Now as a real name and 'the' name, forging both parts of the sentence together'' . 41 Buber and Rosenzweig are clear about how to translate the name of God: they use capitalized personal pronouns, understood as an expression of the presence of God who is there and hence can be addressed:
This quality of relatedness, of reciprocity, inherent in the divine name, ¢rst simply because it is a name and then in particular because of its special meaning, must rather be rendered on the basis of the other side of the relationçthe side of the one who speaks and names. The 'present-to-you' of the original must be rendered by a 'presentto-me' of the translation. . . . the personal pronoun . . . in its three persons means precisely the three dimensions of 'present-to-me': the capacity to be spoken to, the capacity to be spoken by, the capacity to be spoken of. A reconsideration of Rosenzweig's remarks in 'The Eternal'and Buber's reaction to them will help to con¢rm this statement.
ROSENZWEIG'S REMARKS IN 'THE ETERNAL'
Rosenzweig's retroactive thoughts in 'The Eternal'mirror decisions that matured in exchanges with Buber on the Bible translation, although he gives no indication that he himself had previously used 'the Eternal' extensively. Rosenzweig also demonstrates his dislike of the usual translation of God's name as 'the Lord' because of its Christian connotations, and assumes this was also one of the reasons why Mendelssohn chose another term for the translation of God's name: ''When the devout Christian says,'The Lord is my shepherd,' he thinks not of God but of 'the Good Shepherd''', namely Christ. 43 As stated initially, Mendelssohn's crucial insight (''his decisive advance over Calvin and the Protestant Bible'' 44 ) was for Rosenzweig the realization that Mendelssohn's account of the translation of the name of God was to be found only in the account of God's revelation of his name in Exodus:
45 ''Now we do not have to look for Mendelssohn's account of the matter at the ¢rst appearance of the name, i.e. at Gen. 2:4, as we do for Hirsch's. At that point we ¢nd only a reference sending us o¡ to the commentary on Exod. 3:14. '' 46 Looking at Mendelssohn's commentary, ''the surprising fact'' emerges that even for Mendelssohn his ''decision in favor of the abstract, 'philosophical' divine name''ç'the Eternal'ç''was extremely shaky'' . 47 Rosenzweig ascribes Mendelssohn's decision to his pre-Kantian background, against which the phrase ''the Eternal being'' also appears to imply the ''God of prayerful petition'', while today one wouldçif at allçcome to the opposite conclusion ''from the providential God to the necessarily existing God'' . 48 Rosenzweig then follows Benno Jacob 49 in considering the issue textually, which leads to 'the Eternal' being denied as a suitable translation: ''Moses recoils from the role of leader that God commissions him with. So God assures him,'Indeed, I will be-there with you' (3:12). '' 50 Moses then goes on to ask, anticipating the Israelites' questions: ''What is behind his name? What am I to say to them?'' 51 It is in response to the question concerning the meaning of the name, and not concerning the name itself, that Moses answers with the name of God as ''I will be-there'' . Rosenzweig asks: ''What meaning would be o¡ered for the despairing and wretched Israelites by a lecture on God's existential necessity? '' 52 No lesson about God's eternal being is requested, but ''rather an assurance of God's being-with-them'' .
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The only justi¢able translation for Rosenzweig (and Buber) is therefore the one ''that makes prominent not God's being eternal but his being present, his being present for and with you now and in times to come'': 54 the personal pronoun, the expression of the One being present in three sorts of presence, condensed into a single word. Rosenzweig here refers to the explanation in his letter to Martin Goldner, 55 already quoted above. Rosenzweig's further considerations deal with the alternative use of Adonaiçmy Lordçwhich overcomes the shortcomings of Luther's simple 'the Lord' which, while enjoying the advantage of suggesting a relation, nevertheless appears to be a false relation: ''a ruling and not a helping, an overseeing and not an assisting'' .
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With Adonai it is another matter: ''It glances for a moment up from the middle of the sentence toward heaven. '' 57 One can perhaps hear in the rather friendly consideration of the translation 'Lord' an echo of Rosenzweig's early appreciation of Luther's Bible translation.
BUBER'S THOUGHTS IN RESPONSE TO ROSENZWEIG
But what meaning for the despairing and wretched Israelites would be o¡ered by a lecture on God's existential necessity? They, like this timid leader himself, need rather an assurance of God's being-among-them; and unlike their leader, who hears it directly from God's mouth, they need this in the form of a clari¢cation of the old, obscure name, su⁄cient to establish that the assurance is of divine origin.
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This is the extract from Rosenzweig's article that Buber cites in response to Rosenzweig's thinking. From the very outset, Buber always refers to Rosenzweig's words. This comes as no surprise as, according to Buber, it was Rosenzweig who developed the translation of the tetragrammaton: ''I myself only contributed some academic support'', 59 to which he refers in his accounts in Moses (1948) 60 and The Kingship of God (1932 62 which is dedicated to Rosenzweig's memory, Buber paraphrases the essential thoughts contained in Rosenzweig's 'The Eternal' . The nameYHWH alone among the divine epithets in the Bible is entirely a name and not a concept; but it is a name in which biblical consciousness perceives a meaning, or rather the meaning, the meaning that is disclosed in revelation, in the Burning Bush. [. . .] The Septuagint, the Vulgate, and Luther all render it 'the Lord', and thus replace the reality with a ¢ction. Calvin and Mendelssohn render it 'the Eternal', and thus misread the disclosure. The scholarly translations, o¡ering only a transcription (and a highly questionable one), ignore it, and thereby transform the name of God into a name of idols. The name might be rendered 'the one-who-is-there,' or 'the-one-who-is-present', and such a rendering would indeed be founded on a right understanding of the disclosure; but it would also betray that disclosure, in that the certainty that those who trust in revelation feel welling up from every naming of the name would be impaired by a rigid conceptual knowledge capable of grasping in the disclosure only the idea of constancyçthe ehyeh: I shall be thereçbut not the idea of continual and unpredictable renewalçthe asher ehyeh: as whoever I shall be. We had, therefore, to ¢nd in our western language an equivalent that would for the hearing reader create a feeling similar to the certainty issuing from the name, would, that is, not express God's being-with-me, being-with-you, being-with-us conceptually but would embody it in full presence. That is what is done in our translation by the pronouns: the I and MY when God is speaking, the YOU and YOUR when God is spoken to; the HE and HIS when God is spoken of.
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This reads more or less as a paraphrase of Rosenzweig's thoughts, which would support the received view that the choice of the personal pronouns was Rosenzweig's responsibility alone. A short note in 'The How and Why of Our Bible Translation' (1938) reveals, however, that Buber's ''academic support'' may have been more than that. Buber confesses:
It is clear to me now that in our rendering of the Divine name we were right to let ourselves be guided not by the conventional substitution Adonai but by the mysterious acclamation ani va-ho, which had moved me deeply ever since my early youth; I am convinced now that at the origin of the tetragrammaton stood some exclamatory pronoun, some 'taboo word' (as Hans Bauer puts it) for referring in inspired enthusiasm to an ine¡able divinity. 64 The link to Hans Bauer refers to his article 'Gottheiten von Ras Schamra' . Bauer assumes that the Divine name el had been a demonstrative pronoun in the original Semitic language, and continues, as in Buber's sense: '' As for example in Islam, In his ¢rst and untitled typescript, 83 Buber relates his thoughts to the question of whether and how God can have a name. According to Hermann Usener, 84 God's possessing a name is an expression of polytheism. Buber asks, however,''Is it not the case that the possession of a name shows its whole meaning only in the belief in the One God?'' He goes on to surmise that the possession of names of paganism is but a primitive, incomplete level of the relationship that only attains completeness with the possession of the name of the One and real God.
Buber imposes his 'singularistic'theory of names, according to which the function of a name is notças in Minucius Felix's 85 pluralistic theoryçto discern objects or human beings, but to be able to address the being facing oneself. Buber therefore assumes the relation to a 'Thou' and not to a 'Them' as fundamental for the development of names and calls his theory a 'theory of invocation' . 86 The name is not there to discern objects, but to realize their presence, so that the being facing one responds. Giving a name means the invocation of the distinct being. And that is why the god has to be called by a name.
This leads Buber to the boundary between magic and religion. In magic, a non-reciprocal relationship is developed towards the subject being utilized. Man's relationship to the godhead is only a pseudo-relationship, his incantations only pseudo-prayers, as they are not reciprocal. Buber goes on to say that one should not imagine magic and religion as strictly separate, since magic penetrates deep into religion. On the other hand, even a heathen can appeal to the godly when he says 'Thou' in truthçat which point religion distinguishes itself from magic.
In I andThou Buber also expresses a similar thought:''What distinguishes sacri¢ce and prayer from all magic?^Magic desires to obtain its e¡ects without entering into relation, and practises its tricks in the void. But sacri¢ce and prayer are set 'before the Face' in the consummation of the holy primary word that means mutual action: they speak theThou, and then they hear. '' 87 
